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The United States aspires to use information from comparative effectiveness research (CER) to reduce
waste and contain costs without instituting a formal rationing mechanism or compromising patient
or physician autonomy with regard to treatment choices. With such ambitious goals, traditional combinations
of research designs and analytical methods used in CER may lead to disappointing results. In this paper,
I study how alternate regimes of comparative effectiveness information help shape the marginal benefits
(demand) curve in the population and how such perceived demand curves impact decision-making
at the individual patient level and welfare at the societal level.  I highlight the need to individualize
comparative effectiveness research in order to generate the true (normative) demand curve for treatments.
I discuss methodological principles that guide research designs for such studies. Using an example
of the comparative effect of substance abuse treatments on crime, I use novel econometric methods
to salvage individualized information from an existing dataset.
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  Decisions in health care policy and clinical medicine most often involve 
evaluation of alternatives: Which treatment will produce the optimal clinical 
outcome in a given patient?  What type of insurance coverage will maximize social 
welfare? The fundamental problem of ex-ante evaluation is to predict outcomes 
under alternative policies or interventions. A large literature, dating from the early 
1920s, focuses on developing methods to address such problems of evaluation 
(Neyman, 1923; Fisher, 1935). In recent years, health care–related methods and 
applications that belong to this genre of evaluation have been broadly grouped 
under the umbrella term “comparative effectiveness research” (CER). CER conducts 
head-to-head comparisons to determine which drugs, devices, and procedures are 
most effective and carry the lowest risk. The 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act dedicates $1.1 billion to this end. 
The Congressional Budget Office, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC), and other independent stakeholders define comparative 
effectiveness research as “a rigorous evaluation of the impact of different options 
that are available for treating a given medical condition for a particular set of 
patients” (MedPAC Report, 2008).  Notably, “the set of patients” is usually defined by 
broad and easily observable criteria.  In a recent report submitted to the President 
and Congress, the Federal Coordinating Council on Comparative Effectiveness 
Research states: “Clinicians and patients need to know not only that a treatment 
works on average but also which interventions work best for specific types of 
patients (e.g. the elderly, racial and ethnic minorities)” (FCC Report, June 30, 2009). 
Addressing heterogeneity in outcomes and especially in the comparative effects of 
alternative treatments is becoming increasingly popular in such evaluations 
(Sculpher, 2008).  
Recent legislation,1 however, calls for pursuing even finer levels of 
heterogeneity, including "genetic and molecular sub-types or quality of life 
preferences", through CER.   Such an approach may be the key to the success of 
translating comparative effectiveness information into practice.  The popular 
mantra of “what works” associated with CER may not take us far enough unless we 
try to discover “what works for whom” in an individualized manner. In this paper, I 
                                                 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress §6301 (2010). highlight the economics of individualization in CER and discuss methodological 
principles behind individualization. 
   In our analysis, the economics of CER information is driven by the physician-
patient dyad. This dyad is assumed to work together and choose among alternative 
treatments based on its perceived comparative information on benefits of 
treatments (throughout the paper, I regard benefits to represent benefits net of 
harms).  Comparative effectiveness and other evaluative research reveal 
information on the benefits of treatments, which helps the physician-patient dyads 
form perceptions of comparative effects and guides their treatment choice behavior.  
At the population level, aggregate demand is affected. In line with the goals of 
comparative effectiveness research, the question we will ask is how the alternative 
treatments in question will be utilized and how optimal co-insurance rates would 
vary from a social insurer's perspective under alternative informational regimes of 
CER.   
  The benefits anticipated by the physician-patient dyad before taking a 
treatment may not always coincide with the true benefits experienced by a patient. 
Anticipated benefits rely on CER results, which reveal incomplete information, such 
as average benefits.  In contrast to anticipated benefits, a normative ("true") 
marginal benefits curve can be defined by the actual realization of the benefits of 
treatments across individuals. Therefore, unless CER generates information to 
precisely predict these ex-post outcomes for each patient, the true marginal benefit 
schedule will differ from market demand. 
  In Section 2, I highlight the link between CER information and decision-
making and discuss the potential deadweight losses induced by different levels of 
information arising out of CER.  
  In Section 3, I discuss methodological approaches to CER that can generate 
more nuanced2 comparative information than what is typically produced by this line 
of research.  Specifically, I argue and provide rationale for an explicit and intensive 
program within CER that is devoted towards discovering effects at the individual 
level.  
    To highlight the potential of novel econometric approaches to identify 
individual heterogeneity in treatment effects, I draw from the economics literature 
                                                 
2 That is, richer information on heterogeneity rather than higher precision of the average effects.  on program evaluation (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Heckman 1990, 1992; Manski 
and Garfinkel, 1992; Heckman and Smith, 1998; Dehejia, 2005) and present an 
illustrative example of the comparative effectiveness of substance abuse treatments.  
I discuss how CER programs can build on such analyses by collecting additional data 
that can help target specific treatments to patients.  A broader discussion on how 
individualized comparative effects can be generated follows in Section 4. 
 
2. Comparative effectiveness information and decision making 
  Let us begin with a problem of evaluating the comparative effectiveness of a 
new treatment compared to a control/standard treatment for a population of N 
patients indexed by i.  Standard treatment may also include the do-nothing option. 
Let the individual-level true treatment effect represent the benefits (net of harms) 
of the new treatment over the control and is denoted by bi.3 Let p denote the price of 
the new treatment which is also the marginal cost for manufacturing the new 
treatment.4  (We will later relax the assumption of a constant marginal cost curve 
and allow the price to be endogenous and vary with aggregate demand.) 
  Patients are members of risk classes, Ωk , k ≤ N, which determine 
heterogeneity in treatment effects across individuals through a production function 
b(), i.e. bi = b(Ωk ). Risk classes may be defined by the combination of various  risk 
factors such as severity of illness, patient demographics, their genetic makeup, 
preferences and many others factors. In order to predict an individual-level 
treatment effect, one requires knowledge about both the patient's risk class Ωk  and 
the production function b().  CER is responsible for estimating the production 
function.  
  There are two types of decision makers, 1) the patient-physician dyad, which 
we will refer to as the individual decision maker, is assumed to always have 
knowledge about their risk class; and  2) an insurer or social planner who decides 
the coinsurance rate for providing health insurance coverage for the new treatment.    
  
                                                 
3 bi is composed of two parts, one that represents the potential health benefits of treatment and the 
other that represents the potential harms of treatment including adverse events and the costs of 
accessing the treatment (e.g.  time costs etc). This is also in line with the Net Health Benefit's 
approach in cost-effectiveness analysis (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998 ). 
4 Here p can be seen as a normalized price, where the price of the standard/control  treatment is assumed to 
be zero.  2.1. The First best scenario  
  Under complete information, both the insurer and the individuals are aware 
of the risk classes and the production function and are able to perfectly predict bi. 
Here, individuals will choose treatment only if bi - p ≥ 0, when they are exposed to 
the full price of treatments. This is efficient. If individuals had full insurance they 
would choose treatment if bi ≥ 0.  Since the insurer can fully anticipate this 
individual behavior, she can provide full coverage for treatment only for those 
individuals who would experience benefits greater than cost and not provide 
coverage for the rest. Thus, there is no efficiency loss due to moral hazard.  
  Difficulties in achieving the first best scenario are mostly driven by three 
conditions or their combinations. These conditions are the asymmetry of 
information between decision makers, imperfect information to the decision makers 
and incomplete information.   
  
2.2. Scenario with asymmetry of information  
  Asymmetry of information arises when individuals are assumed to be aware 
of Ωk  and b() and to be able to combine them to predict bi perfectly, but the insurer 
cannot. Pauly and Blavin (2008) discuss the case of insurer having no information 
on Ωk . In our terms, the insurer cannot identify individuals who belong to specific 
risk classes even when they are aware of the production function b(). Consequently, 
the insurer cannot exclude patients from coverage who would get treatment 
benefits lower than the cost of treatment (i.e. bi - p < 0). This leads to moral hazard 
(Pauly, 2008) and the insurer may offer coverage with a fractional conisurance rate 
(c), which is the fraction of price a patient must pay in order to receive treatment. 
Figure 1 illustrates this situation. The coinsurance rate is designed to deter  
individuals (i.e. for whom bi - c∙p < 0) from taking treatments  so that the resulting 
moral hazard is traded off  with the benefits of risk protection that insurance 
coverage will provide (Manning and Marquis, 1996).     
  One important aspect, which is typically kept implicit is most analyses under 
asymmetry of information, is that patients who perceive bi < 0 (i.e. the patients at 
the extensive margin), would automatically decline treatment even when such 
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Figure 1: Moral hazard with asymmetric information.  
 
In Figure 1, the potential demand curve for patients with bi < 0 is shown with dotted 
lines. Theoretically, it corresponds to having to pay patients money to accept 
treatments that produce negative benefits. Such behavior is documented in the 
literature on compensating wage-differentials where consumers accept higher 
wages to accept riskier jobs (Thaler and Rosen 1975). However, in health care, such 
behavior is non-existent and therefore when individuals have complete information 
about bi, there is no demand for treatment among those with  bi < 0. That is patients 
will be demand-responsive to treatment (Chakley and Khalil, 2005). The 
implications of such self-selection will be apparent below when these patients fail to 
make such selections based on available information. 5  
 
2.2. Scenario with imperfect information 
  Pauly and Blavin (2008) extends their analyses  to study the scenario where 
patients do "not have demand curves that map the marginal benefit curves 
generated by clinical evidence". That is, even though knowledge on b() is available, 
patients have imperfect information and are unable to precisely predict bi.  
Individuals end up either under or overestimating the benefits of treatment 
                                                 
5 Such self selection behavior is studied extensively in the literature on program evaluation and 
structural modeling (Heckman and Robb 1985; Heckman 1992; Manski and Garfinkel 1992; 
Heckman and Smith 1998 ). In the context of health care, Meltzer et al. (2003) discuss  how such self-
selection behavior based on patient preference heterogeneity may affect cost-effectiveness analyses.  conditional on their risk class.  Pauly and Blavin show how optimal coinsurance 
rates varies under these conditions and discuss potential ways to address the 
inefficiency, which includes value-based insurance designs that can lower 
copayments when patients underestimate benefits (Pauly and Held 1990) and vice 
versa. 
 
2.3. Scenarios with incomplete information  
  Building on Pauly and Blavin's analyses, we study the case when clinical 
evidence reveals incomplete information about the true (normative) marginal 
benefit curve. We assume that individuals possess perfect information on clinical 
evidence, but this evidence may be incomplete.6  We argue that moral hazard due to 
insurance coverage is aggravated when clinical evidence only produces information 
on average benefits. 
  CER estimating average effects: Let individuals and the insurer rely on a CER 
study that reveals information about the average incremental benefits of the new 
treatment over control: B = Ei{b(Ωk )}. This expectation is over all patients including 
those who would be harmed by treatment (bi < 0). Individuals and the insurer do 
not have any additional information about the variability of comparative 
effectiveness in the population. Consequently, individuals have a demand curve that 
is simply an indicator, I(B>c∙p),  and that is same for all individuals.  If new 
treatment is cost-effective on average, (i.e. B > p), then for any co-pay c≤1, all 
patients will choose to receive the new treatment producing a large aggregate 
demand for the treatment and an associated large amount of moral hazard as shown 
in Figure 2.  
  Since average comparative effectiveness information leads to higher demand 
responsiveness to price and lower demand responsiveness to treatments, 
outcomes-based payments may not be worthwhile (Chakley and Khalil, 2005). 
Consequently,  value-based insurance designs, which promote the use of treatments 
that are cost-effective on average (Fendrick et al., 2001), will also promote this 
inefficiency due to moral hazard.  
                                                 
6 This assumption can be relaxed and results from Blavin and Pauly (2008) and Pauly and Held (1990) can 
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Figure 2: Moral hazard with incomplete (average)  CER information. 
   Given  various constraints on time and production and  restricted market 
entry for medical treatments, the marginal cost curve may be increasing over 
quantity in many realistic situations. In such a scenario, the moral hazard loss is 
worsened by the increase in equilibrium prices that accompanies the increase in 
aggregate demand (Jena and Philipson, 2009; Basu and Philipson, 2010) (Figure 3).    
In fact, the equilibrium price may end up being higher than p and even B.  
Consequently, besides a larger moral hazard, a portion of the consumer  surplus and 
wealth will be transferred to the producers. Combined together, they would incur a 
large strain on the demand of health insurance due to the high premiums that the 
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Figure 3: Moral hazard with incomplete (average)  CER information and 
upward sloping marginal cost curve.  
 Individualization  using  nuanced subgroup-specific CER: If CER can evolve to  
reveal more information on risk classes and their associated treatment effects, 
individual demand curves will begin to map to the true normative marginal benefit 
curves.  At the limit, when sufficient heterogeneity in comparative effects is revealed 
it is possible to approach the first best solution described above.  
   Thus with individualized information, expected demand curves begin to be 
less price responsive and more responsive to treatments.   This enhances the role of 
VBID both as an outcome-based payment mechanism (Chakley and Khalil, 2005) 
and also in scenarios  when clinical evidence map the true marginal benefits curve 
but the patients have imperfect information and their perception of benefits fall 
short of it (Pauly and Blavin, 2008).  
 
2.3. Scenarios with combinations of incomplete, imperfect and asymmetry of 
information 
  Consider the situation when the insurer relies on a CER that reveals 
incomplete information about the average benefits of alternative treatments, B. The 
insurer also believes that individuals do not possess any private information that 
can enable them to predict individualized treatment effects.  However, individuals 
may have additional information on b() so that that can anticipate bi based on their 
own risk class. This creates asymmetry of information between insurer and 
individuals. Two specific situations where such anticipation is plausible are: 1) 
where medical knowledge and experience enable physicians to help patients 
anticipate bi , rather imperfectly, based on levels of their risk classes, even though no 
formal CER estimates on such heterogeneity exist. 2)  Individuals have an 
opportunity to reveal bi perfectly, using trial and error methods on both treatments 
within a short period of time, without any noticeable effects on their long-term 
benefits (i.e. costless trial and error method)  and then self-select into treatments 
that maximize their individual benefit. Such situations are quite common in the use 
of pharmaceutical treatments for chronic diseases, in which clinicians help patients 
navigate through a series of choices to select a drug that can provide the maximum 
benefit to that individual. 
  Under either of these situations, the expected demand curve perceived  by 
the insurer is generally flatter  (typical of that in Figure 2) than the empirical expected demand curve in the population set by individual -level behavior. Since the 
insurer then anticipates higher levels of moral hazard than would be true with 
complete information, she is more likely to charge a higher co-insurance rate and/or 
demand a higher premium in this population. At the limit, an insurer may be 
reluctant to provide any coverage in some of these situations even though providing 
it would lead to Pareto improvement.  
  A corollary for this result is that when the insurer is faced with the decision 
of whether to curb coverage on certain products, it will often be useful to learn 
about how individuals are making treatment choices in the presence of coverage 
and the benefits they are realizing on choosing or not choosing a treatment.  This 
will enable the insurer to align her perceived expected demand curve with the 
information set (which may include imperfect information to the individuals) on 
which individual treatment choices are based. Not only the insurer would benefit 
from knowing the complete marginal schedule of benefits but also from learning 
about whether individuals have imperfect anticipations of these benefits (Dehejia, 
2005).  Our empirical example on the comparative effects of substance abuse 
treatments on crime highlights the role of econometric methods in enabling such 
alignment. It can also help generate and disseminate more nuanced comparative 
effectiveness information that could help in individualization.  
      
3. Econometrics for individualized comparative effectiveness research (iCER) 
  Substance abuse treatments (SATs) can reduce crime, improve health, increase 
employment, and reduce spread of infectious diseases such as HIV (IOM 2000). There is 
strong evidence that SATs are effective in lowering abuse of various substances over 
relatively long periods of time (McClellan et al., 1996; Simpson et al., 2002). Crime 
reductions, however, account for much of the economic benefits of SAT (French et al. 
2002; McCollister and French 2003; Dismuke et al. 2004; Sindelar et al. 2004).  Types of 
SAT vary.  
   The goal of our empirical analysis is to generate information about the benefits 
(reduction in the number of armed robberies) of one treatment over another at the 
individual level.  This is in contrast to the goals of a traditional comparative effectiveness 
study that aims to ascertain which treatment would produce the largest reduction in 
crime on average.  The distribution of the estimated individualized incremental benefits 
between two treatments can be used to create the marginal benefits schedule across all patients.  We can also identify patients on this schedule who choose to receive specific 
treatments and therefore form an alternative schedule of marginal benefits only among 
patients who chose a particular treatment.  Comparing the schedule of marginal benefits 
across all patients versus that among patients who choose a specific treatment can help 
an insurer learn about the level of imperfect information that individuals possess and 
therefore help her to make a more efficient decision on coverage.  
 
3a Data 
  The individual-level data comes from the 1992-97 National Treatment 
Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES), a large sample size of voluntary (i.e. those 
who are not mandated to receive treatments by the judicial system) SAT clients 
across three principal modalities. NTIES has a higher follow-up response rate (82%) 
than any comparable client-level follow-up treatment survey (Gerstein and Johnson 
2000; Flynn et al. 2001; Gerstein and Johnson 2001). The sample is drawn from 
units supported by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment. Compared with 
nationally representative client surveys, NTIES included a higher percentage of 
criminal justice clients. It is therefore well suited to analyses of a criminally active 
client population (Zarkin et al. 2002). 
  NTIES is especially useful because its pre-SAT and post-SAT measures record 
whether respondents have committed armed robbery and other offenses, and the 
number of any such offenses based on a self-report, in ranges (0, 1, 2-5, 6-20, 21-
100, 100+).  We convert this into a count variable using the mid-points of the 
intervals (0=0; 1=1; 2-5 = 3.5; 6-20=13.5; 21-100 = 60; 100+ = 100).   
  In line with our previous analyses with this data (Basu et al., 2008), we 
restricted our analysis to self-volunteering clients.  Other clients include referrals 
from judicial systems and it is not clear which criteria were used to make SAT 
selections. We dropped observations from one long-term treatment modality, which 
included only 8 respondents.  We compare three treatment modalities: residential 
short-term (N=675), residential long-term (N=854), and ambulatory outpatient 
(N=1,580) treatment. 
 
3b Potential outcomes and treatment effects between two treatments   We built on the potential outcomes literature in economics and statistics (Roy 
1951; Rubin 1974, 1978; Holland, 1986) and write a structural model for pre and post 






=  = post–period potential outcomes with 
treatment k, and the production functions for these outcomes be:7  











   (  1  ) 
X represents a vector of observed characteristics (factors) and θ represents a vector 
of unobserved characteristics (factors). Treatment selections occur between the pre 
and post periods. Both X and θ affect treatment selection and therefore are 
represent observed and unobserved confounders respectively . Combinations of 
levels of X and θ represents the risk classes denoted by Ωk  in Section 2. 
   The parameter vectorsα and λ represent the coefficients (factor loadings) on 
the observed and unobserved factors respectively. By construction,  
01
10 10 () & () λλ λλ −−  represent the within-treatment (over time) heterogeneity in 
outcomes while 
10
11 () λλ −  represents the between-treatment heterogeneity effects 
in the post period (or how the over-time effects on outcome vary across 
treatments).  
  The main parameter of interest to the traditional CER literature has been the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) or the Conditional Average Treatment Effect 
(CATE) that is conditional on the levels (x) of observed confounders X (Vanness and 
Mullahy 2006) .  
 C A T E ( x )   =   αα −= = −
10 10
11 11 (| ) () EY Y X x x  
 A T E   =   αα ⋅= − ⋅ ∑∑
10
11 C A T E () () ( ) ()
xx x fx x fx     (  2  ) 
Other relevant mean treatment effect parameter from a policy perspective involves 
the Conditional Effect on the Treated (CTT) and the Conditional Effect on the 
Untreated (CTUT).   
  CTT(x) =  αα θ λλ −= = = − + − =
10 10 10
11 11 11 (| 1 , ) () ( () | 1 ) EY Y D X x x E D  
CTUT(x) =  αα θ λλ −= = = − + − =
10 10 10
11 11 11 (| 0 , ) () ( () | 0 ) EY Y D X x x E D ,   (  3  ) 
                                                 
7 Here, linearity is assumed for simplicity, without losing the general point of the discussion. where D =I(treatment choice). Population average or unconditional versions of the 
Effect on the Treated (TT) and the Untreated (TUT) can be obtained by integrating 
over the distribution of observed characteristics (Heckman and Robb 1985).  
  Finally, individualized mean effect parameter is given by the marginal 
treatment effect parameter, which conditions on levels, x and ɵ, of both observed 
and unobserved confounders  (Heckman and Vytlacil 1999): 
 M T E ( X = x, θ=ɵ) =  αα −= −
10 10
11 11 () () EY Y x +ɵ λλ −
10
11 ()       (  4  ) 
MTEs represent average effects for thinner margins in the population defined by 
levels of both X and θ. They represent bi, the building blocks for the normative 
marginal benefits curve, described in Section 2. 
  It is clear from the above expressions that in the absence of between-
treatment heterogeneity, i.e., 
10
11 λλ = ,  all of  the TT(x), TUT(x) and the MTE(x, ɵ) 
parameters converge to the CATE(x)  parameter.  This is an important condition as 
it simplifies the evaluation problem considerably. Meeting this condition implies 
that treatment effects are not heterogeneous over unobserved confounders and 
treatment-effect heterogeneity can be studied entirely based on observed 
confounders. 
  
3c Traditional econometric approach 
  The most popular method to analyze such pre-post data is to use fixed effects 
modeling, which works under the assumption that durable and unobserved client 
characteristics that may be correlated with treatment selection are eliminated 
through a difference-in-difference (DID) approach (Bertrand et al . 2004). However, 
it is not clear, what parameter a DID estimator ends up estimating. 
More generally, observed outcome in the post-period is given 
by
10
11 1 (1 ) YD Y D Y =+ −. This representation is Quandt's switching regression 
framework (Quandt 1958, 1972). Therefore, a difference-in-difference estimator, 
which estimates the expected difference between pre and post outcomes for each 
treatment will produce: () ()
()
()
αα θ λ λ αα θ λ λ
αα θ λ λ θ λ λ
αα θ λ λ λ λ
−= = − −= =
= − == − − ==
=−+ − = −−− − =
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≠ C T T ( x )   o r   C T U T ( x )   o r   C A T E ( x )   o r   M T E ( x , ɵ )       (  5  ) 
Thus, in the presence of both within- and between-treatment effect heterogeneity, the 
DID estimator produces results with no clear interpretations  (LaLaonde, 1986; Heckman, 
1978; 1990).  In the absence of within-treatment heterogeneity (
0
10 λλ = ), CTT(x) is 
identified. While in the absence of both within- & between-treatment heterogeneity 
(
10
110 λλλ ==), CATE(x) is identified.  
 
3d A structural model based approach to analyzing comparative effectiveness of SATs 
To address the limitations of the traditional econometric approach, we directly 
estimate parameters from a structural model for potential outcomes that allows for 
both within- and between-treatment heterogeneity in outcomes. When self-
selection is present, a patient's choice of treatment is based on his anticipation of 
benefits conditional on the idiosyncratic levels of his observed and unobserved 
characteristics. This anticipation may be imperfect and not always coincide with the 
realized (potential) benefits. On average, however, such anticipation would lead 
more patients to choose the better treatment for themselves.  We use a latent factor 
to represent the unobserved durable characteristics of the patients, based on which 
patients select treatments. We specify a model for treatment choice that is based on 
patient's anticipated benefits and models for potential outcomes that are based on 
the patient's realized benefits. 
Treatment choice model: 
Individuals (i) maximize a latent random utility in order to choose 
treatment: { } ik i k DA r g m a x L = ; k = 0 (Outpatient), 1(Short-term), 2 (Long-term).  
Following the traditional random utility model in economics (MacFadden, 1974, 
Manski, 1975), the treatment specific random utility is given as: 
12 3
1 ik k k i k i ik LX ββ β θν =+⋅ +⋅+
 
,         (  6  ) where each coefficient  in  βββ

123
222 ( , , )is normalized to zero.X

represent the vector 
of observed characteristics. We have added the '~' to differentiate the notation of a 
vector for a scalar quantity. For example, the unobserved characteristics (to the 
analyst) are scaled to be represented by one latent factor  1 θ , and   k ν  denotes the 
random error.8  
 
Pre-SAT outcomes model: 
01 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 exp( ) ii i i YX αα α θ ε =+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
 
,       (  7  ) 
where we use a log-linear model for the non-negative outcomes.9 
Post-SAT outcomes model: 
11 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 exp( )
kk k kk
ii i i YX αα α θ ε =+ ⋅ + ⋅ +

,  k = Treatments; 0, 1, 2;   (  8  ) 
  The goal of our analysis is to recover the joint distribution of pre-post 
changes in crime under alternative treatments:
012 (,,) iii F ΔΔΔ, where  10
kk
iii YY Δ= − , 
which would require us to identify  01 (,)
k
ii FY Y , k=1, 2, 3. Note, however, that we do 
not directly observe 1
k
i Y , but only  1 i Y = 1 ()
k
ii ID k Y =⋅. Therefore, we only observe the 
conditional joint distributions 01 (,| )
k
ii i FY Y D k = , which are different than the 
unconditional distributions 01 (,)
k
ii FY Y  due to confounders that affect these outcomes 
and also determine selection into treatment. In our above formulations, we 
represent a reduced form of these confounders using the latent factor θ1i. Once we 
identify θ1i and account for its effect on outcomes, we can not only solve the 
selection bias (i.e. make  k ν ╨ 0 ε ╨ 11 |,
k X εθ

, ╨ denoting statistical independence) but 
can also recover the unconditional distribution  01 (,)
k
ii FY Y  or 01 (,)
k
ii F μμ , where 
00 0 (|, ,) ii i i EY X μ θα =

 and  11 1 (|, ,)
kk k
ii i i EY X μ θα =

. However, in order to identify θ1i 
independent from its effects ( 30 α  and  31
k α ) on outcomes, we must rely on the 
observed conditional joint distribution of  0 (,| ) ii ki FY L D k = and  1 (,| )
k
ii ki FY L D k = , for k 
= 0, 1. These added conditional covariances help us identify the following vector of 
parameters: 
12 0 1 2
3 3 30 31 31 31 1 { , ,,,,,( ) } Var ββαααα θ . These parameters, along with the 
regression coefficients on observed covariates, which are identified using traditional 
                                                 
8 The dependence of choices on pre-SAT outcomes is accounted for by the structural model of pre-SAT 
outcomes in (20) that is also dependent of 

X  and  1 θ . 
9 This is in line with standard statistical models used for count data. In fact, the specification in a structural 
model for potential outcomes is usually not driven by theory, as is the case for any standard outcomes 
regression model. Therefore, goodness of fit tests are conducted by testing the adequacy of fit. regression approaches, can be used to construct the unconditional distribution 
01 (,)
k
ii F μμ. The semi-parametric identification strategy is detailed in Appendix A.  
  For estimation, we let  00 ~( ) ii Y Poisson μ ,  11 ~( ( ) )
k
ii i Y Poisson I D k μ =⋅ , and gave 
non-informative priors on all parameters:
11
2
1 ~ (0, ), ~ (0,10) i Normal Uniform θθ θσ σ  
and all regression coefficients ~ Normal (0, 10E-6). Treatment choice model was 
estimated using: Di ~ Multinomial(π0, π1, π2) with logit link, 
2
3 1 β = .  All other logit 
coefficients ~ Normal (0, 10E-6).  For sensitivity analysis, we also analyzed with 
alternative prior specifications forθ − 1 ~( 1 0 , 1 0 ) i Uniform .  Posterior distribution of 
parameters was obtained via MCMC (Gibbs-Metropolis-Hastings) using WinBUGs 
software. Three independent chains were generated using an MCMC sampling 
technique. Each of these chains was started with random starting values dispersed 
across the support of the parameter space.  The first 10,000 iterations were 
discarded (burn-ins).  
 
3f Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for individuals who were enrolled in 
different SATs.  Patients who chose outpatient treatments were slightly older than 
the other two modalities. Long-stay patients were more likely to be females, while 
short-stay patients were less likely to be blacks. Various other differences in 
observed characteristics exist between the modalities. The baseline number of 
robberies committed was much higher for patients choosing long-stay treatment 
than for either outpatient or short-stay treatments. 
The MCMC results show reasonably quick convergence (assessed via the 
Gelman-Rubin statistic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992) and good mixing of the 
independent chains. Moderate autocorrelation was found between subsequent 
draws for each chain, and consequently thinning of 20 was applied to obtain our 
posterior samples. The posterior means for the latent factor were -0.0001 for the 
overall data and 0.0005, 0.005 and -0.008 for subjects selecting outpatient, long-
term and short-term treatments respectively. The posterior standard deviation was 
0.08 and by design, the same in all groups. Correlation between the latent factor and 
the observed covariates ranged from -0.05 (primary addiction to alcohol) to 0.06 
(primary addiction to cocaine). Results were found to be robust to alternative 
specification of priors for the latent factor. Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients from the treatment choice model. 
Among other factors predicting choice, we find that patients with higher levels of 
the latent factor are significantly more likely to choose short-stay treatment over 
outpatient treatment (given that higher levels of the latent factor are artificially 
made to associate with a greater likelihood of choosing long-stay treatment over 
outpatient treatment).   Table 2 also presents coefficient estimates from the 
outcomes models. We find that the latent factor significantly affects outcomes in 
both the pre and the post period and under all treatment modalities. We find 
significant within-treatment (over time) heterogeneity in effects under outpatient 
treatment.  We also find significant between-treatment heterogeneity in effects.  
Table 3 shows a cross-table for the predicted number of robberies. The rows 
signify the observed treatment groups while the columns signify the potential 
treatment groups. That is, outcomes in cell (A, B) represent what would have 
happened if the group of individuals who had originally received treatment A had 
received treatment B instead. First we find that the model predictions tally well with 
the observed quantities both in the subgroups and also overall. The pre-period 
goodness of fit is especially a testament for the validity of our model, as the 
predictions on armed robbery were able to discriminate between the three 
treatment groups without a treatment-specific indicator or treatment-specific 
coefficients in the pre-period model. That is, this discriminatory ability is entirely 
generated by the latent factor.  
Interesting and policy-relevant comparative effectiveness results (TT and ATE) 
come out of this analysis that would have been masked using the traditional 
econometric approaches (Table 3). Among patients choosing outpatient treatment, 
outpatient treatment produces the largest reduction in armed robberies per patient 
(-0.57 (0.02), p< 0.0001).10  Compared to the second best treatment in this group, 
the short-stay treatment, these reductions were bigger by -0.10 (se = 0.19, p=0.60) 
robberies per patient.  
Among patients choosing short-stay residential treatment, the short-stay 
treatment produces the largest reduction in robberies per patient (-0.53 (0.03) p < 
0.0001). However, it is estimated that outpatient treatment could have also 
produced a similar magnitude of reductions, the difference between the two 
modalities being not significant. Figure 4a illustrates the different marginal benefits 
                                                 
10 Note that the p-value reported is the Bayesian analog of the frequentist p-value. curves for short-stay versus outpatient under alternative information regimes. 
Based on average benefit (incomplete) information, the curve perceived by the 
insurer would be flat and indicate that on average short-stay treatment would 
prevent fewer robberies that outpatient treatment. However, current analyses may 
help the insurer realize that the normative marginal benefits curve (formed using 
estimated MTEs) is downward sloping. Moreover, the individualized marginal 
benefits curve realized amongst those who select short-stay treatment (presumably 
based on imperfect information on MTEs) indicates that a majority of subjects who 
would have obtained small benefits or negative benefits from short-stay treatment 
over outpatient do not choose short-stay.  Nevertheless, there remain opportunities 
to improve.      
Finally, among patients choosing the long-stay residential treatment, outpatient 
treatment (-1.06 (0.04) p < 0.0001)) and not the long-stay treatment (-0.87 (0.04), p 
< 0.0001) is expected to produce the biggest reduction in robberies per patient on 
average, the difference being statistically significant (-0.20 (0.03), p < 0.0001). The 
average treatment effect was highest for the outpatient treatment, signifying that if 
one treatment were to replace all other treatments in this population, it must be the 
outpatient modality. In fact, based on the current choices that these patients are 
making, the average “as-treated” effect, which produces a reduction of -0.64 
robberies per patient, is less (by 0.05 robberies per patient, (se= 0.01, p < 0.0001)) 
than the reductions that could be achieved by having outpatient treatment as the 
only treatment available. From the SP's point of view, if heterogeneity is not 
revealed, the average effects argue for a restriction on coverage on short-term and 
long-term residential treatment. However, looking at the treatment effects on 
treated for individual treatments, it is apparent that the inefficiency in “as-treated” 
results compared to the average treatment effect is generated solely by patients 
choosing long-term residential treatment.  Interestingly, however, not all patients 
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Figure 4: (a) Marginal benefits curve for short-stay versus outpatient under alternative 
information regimes. (b) Distribution of individual level treatment effects among patients 
who chose to receive long-stay residential treatment. Figure 4b shows the joint distribution of predicted individual-level effects 
(MTEs) under the three treatment modalities for patients who in practice chose the 
long-term treatment.  Each dot represents a patient and dots below the 45-degree 
line represent a patient who made suboptimal choices by selecting long-term 
treatment. As evident from the figure, there is considerable heterogeneity in effects. 
In fact, we estimate that 52% of patients receiving long-term treatment make 
suboptimal choices and that the value of achieving individualization that could 
overcome these inefficient choices is about 0.36 robberies per person. 
Corresponding numbers for patients choosing outpatient or short-term treatment 
are 98% and 0.08 or 59% and 0.08 respectively. In these later modalities, even 
though patients appear to make suboptimal choices, the net gain achieved if 
individualization could be attained is relatively low. Overall, the value of 
individualized care over all treatment modalities could achieve a further reduction 
in 0.16 robberies per patient. Compare that to a policy that only relies on the 
average treatment effect and offers outpatient treatment to everyone, and achieves 
only an additional reduction of 0.05 robberies per patient compared to the average 
as-treated effects.  
 
 4. Discussions 
  The $2.5 trillion in health care costs in United States constituted 
approximately 18 percent of GDP in 2009, and at current rates of growth, health 
care will exceed one-fourth of GDP by 2025 (Sisko et al., 2009; CBO, 2008).  As part 
of a portfolio of innovative public policies that are aimed to address this challenge, 
public investments in comparative effectiveness research (CER) are viewed as 
worthwhile endeavors by payers, providers and patients (ACES Testimony, 2009).  
Identifying options that work on average creates winners and losers by influencing 
physician decision making or through coverage decisions that favor the winners, 
and may substantially induce demand for the winners (Meltzer et al. 2007). This 
can, in turn, lead to increases in prices for those options, and therefore cannot 
guarantee decreases in overall expenditures (Basu and Philipson, 2010).  More 
importantly, patient welfare may increase on average but is not likely to achieve the 
full potential that can be tapped through individualization (Basu & Meltzer, 2007; 
Basu, 2009).  In this paper, it is argued that divulging individual-level heterogeneity in 
treatment effects is essential to realize the full potential of CER. The core of this 
argument lies in understanding how CER information influences the behavior of 
individual patients and their providers, which in turn produces a market demand 
curve, as well as in helping a population-level policymaker anticipate a market 
demand curve for a treatment. CER focused on producing average effects results in 
an empirical market demand curve and also a perceived demand curve that is flatter 
or more elastic than it truly should be. Consequently, the decision making that 
follows may lead to perverse results from a welfare perspective.  Individualization, 
on the other hand, reveals the true (normative) downward-sloping demand curve 
and enables decision makers to make improved choices and policies, which can 
assure that health is neither compromised nor distributed inequitably.  
The potential impact on patients' well-being due to individualized CER (i-
CER) can very well be orders of magnitude larger than is possible with the current 
state of CER (Basu 2009). For example, individualization based on preference 
heterogeneity in prostate cancer patients was found to produce benefits that are 
worth 100 times more than identifying better treatment based on average 
preferences (Basu and Meltzer 2007).  Similar empirical evidence on the evaluation 
of SATs are presented in this paper.   
Ideas of individualization and its appropriate uses can have strong 
implications for how comparative effectiveness research is practiced in general. 
Despite the growing consensus that individualization should be a central part of CER 
(Garber and Tunis, 2009), there is little discussion about how such individualized 
effects can be estimated.  Addressing treatment effect heterogeneity using 
“hypothesis testing"-driven approaches by subgroups, which has become the 
traditional approach to comparative effectiveness research, can be an extremely 
inefficient process of information generation.  This is because, more often than not, 
treatment effects vary over subgroups that are defined by the complex interactions 
of many patient characteristics. Thus the number of sub-groups over which 
treatment effect heterogeneity should potentially be studied are numerous and 
cannot possibly be tested (even after adjustments of p-values) using a priori 
specification of subgroups.  
  A key approach to such a problem is to be able to develop prediction 
algorithms for individual-level treatment effect heterogeneity. Such algorithms can 
be constructed without identifying low-dimensional individualized characteristics such as genomic information, but rather by collapsing multi (high)-dimensional 
outcomes and behavior into individual-level latent characteristics, which can be 
used to establish individualized treatment effects. These prediction algorithms can 
be viewed as a hypothesis generation exercise at the individual level. However, 
these algorithms have two extremely useful implications for comparative 
effectiveness research.  First, any attempt to individualize care based on prediction 
algorithms must begin with a hypothesis generation exercise and therefore these 
results can provide valuable resources to clinicians and policymakers, who in their 
absence much rely on traditional comparative effectiveness results on averages. The 
necessity of an algorithmic approach lies in the feasibility of translating enormous 
amounts of information to the bedside, without overwhelming physicians.   Second, 
these results will provide key input to any confirmatory randomized trial evaluating 
and improving such prediction algorithms.   
  For example, although our empirical analysis reveal considerable treatment 
effect heterogeneity across different SAT modalities, the cost of implementing an 
individualized schedule of treatment assignment may be costly. An algorithmic 
approach to CER can help reduce the cost of implementation in this regard and can 
therefore produce value. Identifying the patient characteristics that lead to 
suboptimal choices can help to reallocate by allowing more careful consideration of 
treatment choices. Table 4 identifies the factors responsible for suboptimal 
treatment choices among patients who chose the long-term modality. Note that this 
information is only obtainable because we have identified individual-level treatment 
effects and therefore can identify suboptimal treatment choices ex-post. Table 4 
suggests that secondary addiction to alcohol or cocaine was the only factor that 
predicted long-term residential treatment to be a suboptimal choice.  The latent 
factor was not significantly associated with suboptimal choices. However, future 
research, which collects a wider range of patient-level characteristics, can identify 
components of this latent factor and can further enhance the individualization of 
comparative effectiveness in this field. Future research should also study the 
simultaneous affect of these treatments on a multi-dimensional vector of outcomes 
that are relevant for these patients (Sindelar et al., 2004).  
 Current data from many observational studies and some clinical trials (such 
as the NIMH sponsored CATIE trial, Stroup et al., 2003) contain information to 
identify the joint distribution of potential outcomes but only when paired with novel 
methods such as those that use (latent) factor models (Munkin and Trivedi, 2003; Heckman and Navarro, 2003) and control-functions (Florens et al., 2008). The bases 
for these approaches lie in using patients’ clinical history and behavior as outcomes 
of underlying (latent) processes and characteristics rather than as determinants of 
the comparative effects and thereby identify these latent factors and use them to 
establish individualized comparative effectiveness. Investing in pragmatic trials 
(Tunis et al., 2003) by focusing more on adaptive trials (Cheng and Berry, 2007), 
adaptive assignments within trials (Murphy, 2005), and cross-over designs (Senn, 
2002) could help generate data that potentially have the identifying information for 
individual effects—but such an approach still needs to be paired with the right 
analytical tools to salvage this information.  Observational studies can play a crucial 
role in this process as they carry rich information about choices. Investing in 
longitudinal databases, measurements of cognitive and non-cognitive capabilities of 
patients that are predictive of behavior, and outcomes and development of novel 
methods in this field will be the key to achieving this ambitious paradigm of CER.  
Therefore, a commitment to further develop and refine these methodologies seems 
to be of significant scope within the CER agenda.     
A crucial challenge lies in translating the enormous volume and rich evidence 
on individualized care to the bedside. Leveraging health information technology to 
enable seamless translation will also be crucial for this purpose. The current 
administration’s investments in both comparative effectiveness and health 
information technology are a major step toward achieving a more efficient health 
care system. It remains to be seen whether researchers, providers and payers can 
take this opportunity to deliver on the expectations.  
Finally, individualized CER can guide research prioritization in the future. It 
can identify misalignments between individual and social decision making, in terms 
of anticipation of potential outcomes and behavior at both levels, and direct future 
research to eliminate such misalignments and enhance social welfare. Even when 
decision making at the two levels becomes aligned, it is important to understand the 
dependence in potential outcomes that is driven by unobserved or non-forecastable 
heterogeneity at the individual level. Future research that transforms a portion of 
today’s uncertainty about comparative effects (deemed to be first-order) into 
identifiable/observable heterogeneity (e.g. genetic and epigenetic factors) in 
comparative effects can improve welfare through better individual and social 
decision making in the future. 
   Identification 
Identification is required for the following set of parameters: 
12 0 1 2
3 3 30 31 31 31 1 { , ,,,,,( ) } Var ββαααα θ . The rest of the regression coefficients are 
identified based on the variances of Y, X and their covariances using traditional 
regression approaches. What follows is conditional on estimating these other 
regression coefficients.  The following details the sequence of identification of all the 
remaining parameters in the models: 
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Table 1: Descriptives of patients under each SAT 
   Outpatient Short -stay Long-stay
Descriptives  N=1580 N=675 N=854








Female  27.5% 29.3% 52.2%
Non-Hispanic Black  62.2% 44.6% 62.8%
Hispanics  14.6% 16.6% 10.0%
Currently married  20.1% 25.8% 15.5%
Ever homeless in last 12 months  16.8% 19.9% 26.0%
Released from jail/prison in last 12 months 38.1% 44.4% 34.2%
Child in Household  24.6% 18.7% 24.8%
No income in last 12 months  10.5% 10.4% 10.9%
No wage income in last 12 months 49.9% 34.1% 55.6%
Wage income < $3000 in last 12 months 19.2% 17.2% 19.3%
Medicaid   29.2% 8.9% 26.0%
Primary addiction to cocaine  38.9% 32.6% 60.5%
Primary addiction to alcohol  38.1% 19.9% 15.3%
Secondary addiction to cocaine/alcohol 39.3% 39.6% 53.2%
Pre-period armed robberies, mean (sd) 0.66 (6.05) 0.63 (5.34) 1.25 (7.03)
Post-period armed robberies, mean (sd) 0.09 (0.89) 0.1 (1.06) 0.38 (4.17)
 
 Table 2: Posterior mean and standard deviation estimates for regression coefficients. 
 
   Treatment Choice Model  Outcomes Models 
Short-stay vs  Long-stay vs  Pre-period  Post-period  Post-period  Post-period 
   Outpatient  Outpatient     Outpatient  Short-stay  Long-stay 
Age (years)  -0.03 (0.01)+  -0.003 (0.01)  -0.28 (0.04)+  -0.08 (0.02)+  -0.11 (0.06)  -0.42 (0.05)+ 
Female  1.16 (0.11)+  0.62 (0.12)+  -2.59 (0.56)+  -1.71 (0.43)+  2.41 (1.04)+  -0.16 (0.57) 
Non-Hispanic Black  -0.72 (0.13)+  -0.7 (0.13)+  0.32 (0.51)  -0.31 (0.35)  -1.2 (0.82)  -1.41 (0.54)+ 
Hispanics  -0.72 (0.17)+  -0.24 (0.16)  -0.32 (0.61)  0.39 (0.39)  0.12 (1.22)  0.01 (0.7) 
Currently married  -0.13 (0.13)  0.41 (0.13)+  -0.33 (0.63)  -1.85 (0.65)+  -4.93 (1.61)+  2.74 (0.79)+ 
Ever homeless  0.45 (0.12)+  0.41 (0.13)+  2.62 (0.48)+  1.76 (0.31)+  1.2 (1.01)  4.05 (0.55)+ 
Released from jail/prison  -0.03 (0.11)  0.05 (0.11)  1.87 (0.44)+  0.82 (0.3)+  2.46 (1.07)+  2.72 (0.49)+ 
Child in household  -0.22 (0.12)  -0.33 (0.13)+  -0.69 (0.62)  0.2 (0.38)  -2.44 (1.78)  0.1 (0.69) 
No income  0.04 (0.12)  -0.86 (0.13)+  0.63 (0.52)  0.15 (0.37)  2.75 (1.23)+  3.69 (0.66)+ 
No wage income  0.02 (0.14)  -0.69 (0.15)+  0.11 (0.55)  0.94 (0.38)+  4.23 (1.19)+  2.25 (0.69)+ 
Wage income < $3000  0.06 (0.17)  0.11 (0.19)  0.81 (0.61)  -0.16 (0.48)  -2.57 (1.35)  -3.95 (0.72)+ 
Medicaid   -0.48 (0.12)+  -1.32 (0.16)+  0.95 (0.52)  0.27 (0.33)  -24.75 (14.08)  -1.96 (0.52)+ 
Pr. addiction to cocaine  0.65 (0.13)+  -0.67 (0.13)+  0.22 (0.51)  -0.27 (0.35)  -0.87 (0.74)  6.25 (0.75)+ 
Pr. addiction to alcohol  -0.73 (0.14)+  -1.49 (0.14)+  -1.29 (0.59)+  -0.91 (0.37)+  -26.64 (13.71)  4.66 (0.73)+ 
Sec. addiction to cocaine/alcohol  0.44 (0.1)+  -0.06 (0.1)  1.81 (0.43)+  0.61 (0.29)+  -0.44 (1.04)  0.04 (0.47) 
Theta  3.08 (1.06)+  1  37.09 (11.39)+  19.27 (6.03)+  33.05 (9.9)+  30.72 (9.88)+ 
_cons  -0.8 (0.17)+  0.68 (0.15)+  -11.98 (1.14)+  -6.09 (0.7)+  -13.36 (2.99)+  -19.61 (1.94)+ 
+: Bayes p-val <0.05        diff with pre          
         in Theta coeff  -17.8 (5.9)+  -4.0 (7.4)  -6.37 (3.55) 
 























  E(change)  - -0.57 (0.02)+ -0.47 (0.19)+  -0.17 (0.12)













  E(change)  - -0.51 (0.03)+ -0.53 (0.03)+  -0.32 (0.24)













  E(change)  - -1.06 (0.04)+ -0.54 (0.58)  -0.87 (0.04)+
   
OVERALL  Observed  0.81 - - - 0.17
  Predicted  .81 (.02)+ 0.12 (0.01)+ 0.31 (0.23)   0.42 (.09)+ 0.17 (0.01)+
  E(change)  -0.69 (0.02)+ -0.51 (0.23)+  -0.39 (0.09)+ -0.64 (0.02)+
   
+ Bayes p-value < 0.05; E(change) = Post - Pre 
 Table 4: Factor responsible for suboptimal choices among patients who  
chose long-term residential treatment. 
 
   logit(Suboptimal Choices) 
   OR    (95% CI)     [p-value] 
Age (years)  0.99 (0.98, 1.01) [0.461] 
Female  1.02 (0.74, 1.41) [0.891] 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.81 (0.55, 1.2) [0.297] 
Hispanics  0.86 (0.48, 1.55) [0.625] 
Currently married  1.23 (0.86, 1.75) [0.262] 
Ever homeless  1.07 (0.77, 1.5) [0.677] 
Released from jail/prison  0.98 (0.7, 1.36) [0.897] 
Child in household  1.20 (0.83, 1.74) [0.331] 
No income  1.23 (0.75, 2.01) [0.412] 
No wage income  0.90 (0.64, 1.26) [0.529] 
Wage income < $3000  0.85 (0.55, 1.33) [0.485] 
Medicaid   1.06 (0.79, 1.43) [0.693] 
Pr. addiction to cocaine  0.89 (0.59, 1.34) [0.563] 
Pr. addiction to alcohol  0.84 (0.54, 1.29) [0.415] 
Sec. addiction to cocaine/alcohol  1.35 (1.02, 1.78) [0.037] 
Theta  1.01 (0.21, 4.83) [0.987] References: 
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